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Abstract
This Article draws upon, but reworks, John Rawls’ framework from Political Liberalism to
determine the degree of educational autonomy that illiberal perfectionist religious groups
ought to enjoy in a liberal state. I start by arguing that Rawls mistakenly concludes that
political liberalism flatly cannot accommodate Perfectionists, and that his misstep is
attributable to two errors: (1) Rawls utilizes an overly restrictive “political conception of the
person” in determining who participates in the original position, and (2) Rawls overlooks
the possibility of a “federalist” basic political structure that can afford significant political
autonomy to different groups within a single country. With these insights, I argue that some,
though not all, religious Perfectionists are consistent with a stable liberal polity, and explain
why foundational Rawlsian premises require that Perfectionists be accommodated to the
extent possible.
My ultimate conclusions are that liberal polities ought to grant significant autonomy to
those illiberal groups that satisfy specified conditions, and that the autonomy of such
“eligible” illiberal groups is subject to two further constraints, which I call “well-orderedness”
and “opt-out.” The autonomy to which eligible Perfections are entitled includes the authority
to educate their children in a way that provides a fair opportunity for the groups to
perpetuate themselves. The constraint of well-orderedness, however, permits the State to
impose educational requirements that facilitate peace and political stability. Accommo
dating eligible illiberal groups, subject to these constraints, is an instantiation of liberal
commitments, not a compromise of liberal values.
Keywords
Rawls; Political Liberalism; political conception of the person; federalism; perfectionism;
education; exit; Kymlicka; Sen; Waldron
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The scope of the educational autonomy of religious groups in a democratic
state is one facet of the larger question of how liberal polities should deal
with illiberal1 communities in their midst. This is not to suggest that all
religious communities are illiberal, but only that the most difficult questions in the field of education arise with respect to illiberal religious communities. I believe the answer is best approached as follows.2 A cornerstone
of liberal democracy is that governmental authority rests on citizen consent. But because it is unrealistic to expect that each generation should
establish a new constitution that remakes government to reflect the consent of that generation, and for other reasons as well,3 the most that can be
expected is hypothetical consent. My approach to determining the governing structure to which citizens hypothetically consent builds upon John
Rawls’s framework in Political Liberalism, though it deviates from it in some
important respects. It also draws on important contributions by Will
Kymlicka, Jeremy Waldron, and Amartya Sen.
Briefly, I claim that (a) foundational commitments require that liberal
polities grant significant autonomy to those illiberal groups that satisfy certain (relatively narrow criteria, but that (b) the autonomy of such “eligible”
illiberal groups is subject to two constraints that I call “well-orderedness”
and “opt-out.” The autonomy to which they are entitled includes the
authority to educate their children in a way that provides a fair opportunity
for the groups to perpetuate themselves. Accommodating eligible illiberal
groups, subject to the two constraints, is an instantiation of liberal commitments, not a compromise of liberal values.
The essay proceeds as follows. Part I identifies some insights from
Amartya Sen’s recent book that are particularly relevant to this essay’s
1 I do not intend to provide a formal definition of “illiberal,” but I am referring roughly
to groups that are structured along patriarchal, theological, racist, classist, or homophobic lines. Such groups tend to reject core liberal commitments associated with such values
as equality and the liberty of individuals to choose their role and station in life. It may
be argued that what I refer to as “illiberal” groups can be characterized as embracing
liberal values, albeit differently understood from the way contemporary secular regimes
understand liberal values. The present paper does not consider such arguments, but assumes
instead that some religious groups espouse values deeply antagonistic to liberalism, and
considers the degree to which foundational liberal commitments impel liberal regimes to
accommodate such “illiberal” religious groups.
2 I began exploring many of the ideas that are developed here in two previous works:
“The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance: A Liberal Theory”, 84 Virginia Law
Review 1053–1144 (1998), and ““Illiberal” Societal Cultures, Liberalism, and American Consti
tutionalism”, 12 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 803–842 (2002).
3 See R. Barnett, The Presumption of Liberty (2004).
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contractarian argument. Part II considers the implications for religious
groups of Kymlicka’s well-known defense of minority cultural rights. In so
doing, Part II defends Kymlicka’s argument against several trenchant criticisms by Jeremy Waldron, and also points out some respects in which
Kymlicka’s framework needs to be enriched.
Part III, the core of this essay, suggests that Rawls’ Political Liberalism,
properly understood, provides an appropriate framework for determining
the degree of educational autonomy that illiberal religious groups ought to
enjoy in a liberal state. But Part III is not a straightforward application of
Rawls’ framework, for it argues that Rawls mistakenly concludes that political liberalism cannot make room for Perfectionists. Rawls’ mistake is attributable to two errors: his “political conception of the person” is too restrictive,
and he overlooks the possibility of a “federalist” basic political structure
that can afford significant political autonomy to different groups within a
single country. With these insights, Part III argues that some, though not all
religious Perfectionists are consistent with a stable liberal polity, and
explains why foundational Rawlsian premises require that Perfectionists
be accommodated to the extent possible. Part III then explains how these
conclusions implicate the question at hand concerning the educational
autonomy of religious groups. The essay closes with a short conclusion.
My framework does not purport to provide a comprehensive set of considerations that appropriately inform the scope of educational autonomy
of religious communities in every liberal state. Longstanding compromises
and practices, past historical injustices, and what is practically necessary to
maintain political stability may be relevant factors in some circumstances.
But the perspective provided by political theory is important, even if
not determinative. Among other things, the understanding afforded by
political theory allows an appreciation of what costs, if any, are entailed
when a polity elects to give religious groups some measure of educational
autonomy.
I. The Continuing Relevance of Social Contractarian Approaches
to Choosing Institutions
My approach in considering illiberal groups’ educational autonomy in liberal polities is of the social contractarian type, in the tradition of Rousseau,
Locke, and Kant. Before proceeding, I feel it is important to respond to an
argument recently put forth by Amartya Sen in his new book The Idea of
Justice. Sen rejects contractarianism and champions instead what he claims
to be an alternative stream of non-contractarian enlightenment writers

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2186229
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that includes, according to Sen, Adam Smith, Condorcet, Wollstonecraft,
Bentham, Mill, and Marx. Sen assimilates these writers into what he calls a
social choice theory-inspired approach to justice.4 A response to Sen’s
thoughtful critique is therefore appropriate for one such as myself who
continues to rely on contractarianism.5
Sen makes many important points. He rightly critiques the contractarians’ tendency to equate justice with the identification of a unique, “transcendentally” ideal set of governmental institutions.6 Sen argues instead
that any account of justice must take into consideration the actual “social
realizations” of institutional arrangements, which turn not only on institutions but on how people in a given society behave.7 Moreover, Sen persuasively argues that rather than focusing on perfect institutions to which
citizens unanimously would assent, much can be gained through a more
minimalist approach that aims to eliminate or minimize universally recognized injustices (such as famine and slavery). The argument I provide below
draws on Sen’s constructive criticisms at several junctures.
But Sen oversells the implications of his arguments vis-à-vis contractarianism. Rather than slaying contractarianism,8 Sen’s barrages highlight ways
in which it should be reworked9 and establish that contractarianism is an
incomplete tool for determining what justice requires and that consequently requires supplementation.10 But Sen’s approach does not displace
4 See A. Sen, The Idea of Justice 86 (2009).
5 Although Sen’s 400-plus page book is far too deep and wide for me to provide anything
approaching an adequate treatment here, I feel it necessary to address several arguments he
propounds that have direct relevance to the questions addressed in this paper.
6 See Sen, supra note 4, at 68, 84–85.
7 Ibid.
8 See Sen, supra note 4, at 69–71. Moreover, virtually all of Sen’s firepower is directed at
Rawls’ second principle of justice, which concerns distributive justice. Sen and others convincingly disprove Rawls’ claim that reasonable people would unanimously adopt the difference principle by identifying a set of plausible alternative principles. The analysis I
undertake concerns Rawls’ first principle of justice – the priority of liberty – with which Sen
is largely in agreement.
9 For example, there is no reason why contractarianism cannot take account of people’s
actual behavior and the actual consequences of governmental institutions. See Sen, at 68.
Indeed, it seems that doing so would only strengthen contractarianism. Similarly, Sen
inveighs against the contractarians’ tendency to neglect the wisdom that can come from
looking at the experiences of people outside the political community that is the subject of
the social contract. See Sen, supra note 4, at 70. But there is nothing inherent in contractarianism that demands such ethnocentricism, and again, expanding the range of considerations can only be expected to improve contractarianism.
10 For example, Sen convincingly argues that justice can impose obligations in matters
that do not fall within the jurisdiction of any governmental institutions. For example, one
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the need for contractarianism. Sen acknowledges the enduring significance
of governmental institutions,11 but his approach neither explains how governmental institutions should be chosen nor why their exercise of power is
legitimate. Although Sen rightly inveighs against the contractarians’ exclusive focus on institutions, a full theory of justice must guide the choice of
institutions and justify their exercise of power. Contractarianism performs
these important functions, and performs them well: the cornerstone of
contractarianism is that citizens’ consent legitimizes the choice of institutions and their exercise of power, and I suspect that this idea reflects a
broad consensus in liberal states.
Indeed, it is not at all clear that Sen himself abandons contractarianism,
although I cannot fully demonstrate this here. After all, the vehicle that
transports readers to all Sen’s conclusions about what justice demands is
public reasoning.12 But why does public reasoning impose duties? Sen does
not directly answer this question.13 One possibility is that the demands of
justice are somehow self-animating. This sounds quite natural law-like, and
at the very least requires a justification that Sen does not supply. Another
possibility is that Sen relies on unstated contractarian assumptions, equating the conclusions of public reasoning with what people would agree to.
However Sen answers the question of why the conclusion of public reason imposes (or identifies) the duties of justice, in the end there may not be
much gap between Sen’s reliance on public reason and the hypothetical
consent that Rawls and I invoke.
II. Kymlicka, Waldron’s Critique, and the Need for a Richer Framework
A. Kymlicka
Before coming to the Rawlsian framework that comprises my main
argument, I briefly examine Will Kymlicka’s powerful and elegant
argument in defense of protecting minority cultures because it has ready
implications for religious communities.14 Kymlicka’s argument turns on his
can speak of the requirements of justice in connection with transnational and global phenomena without necessarily requiring the creation of transnational or global institutions.
11 Sen, supra note 4, at 82.
12 See, e.g., Sen, supra note 4, at 324 (“From earlier chapters of this book, it should be clear
how central the role of public reasoning is for the understanding of justice”).
13 Sen comes closest to doing so in pages 31–51, yet even there a response to the question
identified above in the text is more assumed than provided.
14 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship 70–169 (1995).
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understanding of the role that “societal culture” plays in an individual’s life.
Kymlicka claims that societal culture “provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social,
educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both
public and private spheres.”15 Cultures are “embodied in social life” by being
“institutionally embodied” in schools, the media, the economy, and
government.16 This type of embodiment accounts for the critical role that
societal culture plays in shaping its members.17
According to Kymlicka, access to a societal culture is a precondition to
freedom. “[F]reedom involves making choices amongst various options,
and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes
them meaningful to us.”18 As a result, “[f]or meaningful individual choice to
be possible, individuals need… access to a societal culture.”19 This is because
“[p]eople make choices about the social practices around them, based on
their beliefs about the values of these practices… [a]nd to have a belief
about the value of a practice is, in the first instance, a matter of understanding the meanings attached to it by our culture.”20
On the basis of this understanding of societal culture, Kymlicka argues
that denying persons access to their societal culture is unjust because it
violates the fundamental liberal values of liberty and equality.21 That is to
say, whereas people in the majority culture have access to their own societal culture and the freedom to make meaningful choices among options
that the dominant societal culture provides, people in minority cultures,
who are not afforded access to their societal cultures, lack this freedom of
choice. That the majority culture permits those from minority cultures to
adopt the majority’s societal culture is not sufficient to counter this inequality because most people are strongly attached to their particular societal
culture.22 The fact that they can adopt another culture is too costly a precondition to the exercise of freedom to make it just to deny them access to
their own societal cultures.23
15 Kymlicka, supra note 14 Ibid., at 76.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., at 83.
19 Ibid., at 84 (emphasis added).
20 Ibid., at 83.
21 Ibid., at 108–15.
22 Ibid., at 85–86.
23 Ibid., at 86. Kymlicka correctly notes that this conclusion, which is based on generalizations about human needs, is unaffected by the fact that some individuals might elect to
abandon the culture into which they were born and adopt another. Ibid.
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B. Waldron’s Critique
Jeremy Waldron has sharply criticized Kymlicka’s argument as “guilty of
something like the fallacy of composition.”24 Waldron believes that
“Kymlicka’s argument shows that people need cultural materials,” but does
not establish that people need a single cultural framework that serves the
purposes Kymlicka’s claims. According to Waldron, Kymlicka’s argument
fails because cultures are not pristinely distinctive, but instead are mélanges
drawn from disparate cultural sources. From this, Waldron argues, it follows
that
the ethical importance of cultural wholes or integrated cultural frameworks
is thrown into question. With it goes the idea that it is important for each
person to be related to a secure and integrated framework via her membership
in some community in particular… A person needs cultural meanings; but she
does not need a homogeneous cultural framework.25

Put more bluntly, Waldron thinks he has demonstrated that “membership
in a particular community, defined by its identification with a single cultural
frame or matrix, has none of the importance that Kymlicka claims it does.”26
But Waldron’s argument hardly undermines Kymlicka’s claim. Even if
Waldron is correct that most cultures contain elements that originated in
other cultures, his argument falls short of establishing his conclusion
because it neglects the fact that the receiving culture may have adapted
the foreign elements. Indeed, there is strong empirical evidence that this
phenomenon of “adapted adoption” (as I dubbed it elsewhere) is widespread.27 The process of adapted adoption has several components. The
receiving culture may literally rework the meaning of the foreign element.28
The receiving culture must also necessarily determine what weight or
importance is to be ascribed to the foreign element, particularly when it
24 J. Waldron, “Multiculturalism and Melange”, in R.K. Fullwider (ed.), Public Education in
a Multicultural Society 102 (1996).
25 Ibid., at 104.
26 J. Waldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, 25 U. Mich. J. L.
Reform 751, 786 (1991–1992) (emphasis added).
27 M.D. Rosen, “Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law:
Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act”, 69 Fordham Law Review 479 (2000).
Similarly, it is well established that Catholicism differs greatly between (for instance) Africa,
the Scandinavian countries, and France.
28 For example, biblical scholars have long explained that the Hebrew Bible reworked
ancient near-Eastern myths so that they reflected Israelite conceptions of the Divine. See,
e.g., J.L. Kugel, How to Read the Bible, 69–80 (2007).
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stands in tension, or conflicts with other parts of the recipient culture.
In these respects, adapted adoption is a process of integrating the foreign
element so that it coheres with the rest of the receiving culture, even if in
doing so it alters the receiving culture.
The process of adapted adoption helps explain why the mere fact
that there are shared elements among cultures does not undermine
Kymlicka’s claim that cultures are meaningfully distinctive in the sense that
persons (many, at least) would feel harmed if they did not have access to
their culture. To give some concrete examples, Jewish culture remains
meaningfully distinctive even if (a) the Passover Seder was modeled on
Greek and Roman festive banquets and (b) the biblical author(s) borrowed
from the Epic of Gilgamesh when composing the story of Noah and the
flood. Similarly, Islamic culture is meaningfully distinctive even if both
Islamic and Jewish law have similar dietary restrictions, and even if both
religious traditions define the start of day as the time when a person is
able to distinguish between two differently colored threads. In short, cultures can be meaningfully distinctive even if they share some common
elements.
Consider Waldron’s further critique of Kymlicka. Waldron argues that
[n]one of us needs to be immersed in one of the small-scale communities
which, according to Kymlicka and others, are alone capable of securing this
integrity and homogeneity. Some, of course, still may prefer such immersion,
and welcome the social subsidization of their preference. But it is not, as
Kymlicka maintained, a necessary presupposition of rational and meaningful
choice.29

This critique rests on a misapprehension of Kymlicka’s argument. Kymlicka
does not claim that everyone needs to be raised in the culture of a smallscale community. Indeed, Kymlicka’s equality argument implicitly acknowledges that there can be a societal culture at the level of a large country.
Kymlicka’s argument is that people who belong to a sub-culture must be
given access to their particular (sub) cultures if they are to have liberty
equal to that of members of the larger societal culture. For Kymlicka,
belonging to some culture is a presupposition of rational and meaningful
choice, not necessarily belonging to a small culture.
Although Waldron fails to show that Kymlicka’s approach is premised on
a logical fallacy, his arguments are illuminating for our purposes. First, they
show that he and Kymlicka share some important common ground:
29 J. Waldron, supra note 26.
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Waldron accepts Kymlicka’s claim that culture is very important for people
at least insofar as “choice takes place in a cultural context, among options
that have culturally-defined meanings.”30 Second, both Kymlicka and
Waldron recognize that their political theories rest on non-axiomatic (and
therefore contestable) theories of personhood.31 In Waldron’s well-chosen
words, even “a theory of toleration or liberal neutrality” requires a “thin
theory of choice, agency, and responsibility.”32 Juxtaposing Kymlicka’s and
Waldron’s theories concretely demonstrates how even a “thin” theory of
personhood is invariably “controversial.”33 The extent to which there can be
controversy even with regard to such a “thin” theory is shown in Part III(B),
which contrasts Kymlicka’s and Waldron’s understandings with Rawls’s
rather different theory of personhood.
C. The Need for a Richer Framework
Kymlicka makes a powerful argument for affording significant autonomy
to minority cultures. Less well worked out and less convincing are two
exercises of group power that he believes to be illegitimate under liberal
premises. The first of these is what Kymlicka calls “internal restrictions,”
that is, the “demand by a minority culture to restrict the basic civil or political liberties of its own members.”34 Kymlicka is unfortunately vague about
the contents of “civil and political liberties,” although he seems to equate
them with the “freedom and capacity to question and possibly revise the
traditional practices of their community.”35 He backtracks somewhat, however, concluding that internal restrictions sometimes may be “justified, on
a temporary basis, where they are required to protect the society from literal disintegration.”36 The second type of activity that Kymlicka claims is

30 Ibid., at 102.
31 See Waldron, supra note 26, at 759 (“Any political theory . . . must be predicated on
some view of what human life is like.”); Kymlicka, supra note 14, at 87, 90 (the reasons for
people’s strong bonds to their culture “lie deep in the human condition [and are] tied up
with the way humans as cultural creatures need to make sense of their world, and [ ] a full
explanation would involve aspects of psychology, sociology, linguistics, the philosophy of
mind, and even neurology”).
32 Waldron, supra note 26, at 760.
33 Ibid., at n.30.
34 Kymlicka, supra note 14, at 152.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., at 230 n.i (“Some restrictions on individual freedom within the minority community may be justified, on a temporary basis, where they are required to protect the society
from literal disintegration.”).
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inconsistent with liberal theory is “external restrictions” that “oppress or
exploit other groups.”37
Not only is there uncertainty as to the precise contents of Kymlicka’s
“internal” and “external” restrictions, but Kymlicka’s framework neither
offers a principled reason why minority cultures should be subject to
these constraints nor why they should not be subject to additional limitations. Rawls is a much more systematic thinker, and his richer framework
provides a more principled method for identifying the appropriate limits
to the autonomy of minority cultures. (Interestingly, as we soon shall
see, the appropriate limitations that flow from a Rawlsian framework
track Kymlicka’s “internal” and “external” restrictions. The Rawlsian framework, though, provides considerably more guidance in specifying their
content).
There is another respect in which Kymlicka’s framework is inadequate.
Even if a minority culture desires to impose what Kymlicka deems to be
impermissible internal or external restrictions, Kymlicka concludes that
the majority liberal culture does not have the power to “coercively impo[se]
liberalism.” Rather, the liberal state can only “offer[] various incentives for
liberal reforms” to “self-governing national minorities” within the liberal
state.38 Kymlicka concludes that liberal states ought to relate to illiberal
groups in the way that liberal states relate to illiberal countries or to illiberal
groups located in other countries.39 Kymlicka is less committal regarding
other minority cultures, concluding that “[a] more complicated case
involves long-standing ethnic or religious sects who have been allowed to
maintain certain illiberal institutions for many years, even many generations.”40 These conclusions strike me as overly accommodating of illiberal
minority groups insofar as there may be some practices that liberal polities
may legitimately elect not to accommodate. Again, Rawls’s more systematic framework facilitates a fleshing out of these types of limitations, and
I address them below in Part III(E)-(F).
III. The Original Position and the Just State
We are now in a position to proceed to Rawls’s analytical framework in
Political Liberalism. In so doing, I shall refer back to Kymlicka’s and
37
38
39
40

Ibid., at 152.
Ibid., at 168.
Ibid., at 164–65.
Ibid., at 170.
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Waldron’s understandings of culture, as well as to Sen’s informative critiques of contractarianism.
A. The Original Position and the Presumptive Need to Accommodate
Religious Communities
John Rawls’s project in Political Liberalism is to describe the basic structure
of a stable and enduring democratic constitutional regime that can win the
wholehearted support of a citizenry having a plurality of irreconcilable
“comprehensive doctrines.”41 Rawls famously elucidates the basic structure
of political society using the heuristic device of the “original position.”
Under the original position, people are to identify the fair political structure by conceiving themselves as being under a “veil of ignorance” under
which they “do not know the social position, or the conception of the good
(its particular aims and attachments), or the realized abilities and psychological propensities, and much else, of the persons they represent.”42
Because
the parties do not know whether the beliefs espoused by the persons they
represent is a majority or a minority view… [t]hey cannot take chances by
permitting a lesser liberty of conscience to minority religions, say, on the
possibility that those they represent espouse a majority or dominant religion
and will therefore have an even greater liberty. For it may also happen that
these persons belong to a minority faith and may suffer accordingly. If the
parties were to gamble in this way, they would show that they did not take the
religious, philosophical or moral convictions of persons seriously, and, in
effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical, or moral conviction was.43

The veil of ignorance is therefore a heuristic for enabling people to transcend their self-interests in order to identify a just and fair political
structure. Stated differently, the veil of ignorance transforms personal selfinterest into society-wide interest: People in the original position choose a
political structure that maximally accommodates others because they do
not know whom they actually represent, and accordingly do not want to
risk creating a polity that did not accommodate whomever it is they happened to be.
It follows that people in the original position would not “gamble”44 by
selecting a political structure that might preclude them from living in
41
42
43
44

J. Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765, 784 (1997).
J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 305 (1996).
Ibid., at 311 (emphasis supplied).
Ibid.
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accordance with their religious convictions. In Rawls’s words, allowing
autonomy for only select persons’ conceptions of the good would constitute a “gamble [that would] show that [the person in the original position]
did not take the religious, philosophical or moral convictions of persons
seriously and, in effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical, or
moral conviction was.”45 A rational person would not do such a thing.
All this has implications for the question at hand. For many, the freedom
to live in accordance with one’s religious convictions presupposes the existence of a religious community of which they are a part, and derivatively,
an educational system that can sustain the community. The political structure chosen under the original position would accordingly be one that
afforded religious communities the autonomy to educate their children so
that their community can be perpetuated.
This conclusion, however, is subject to several caveats that are best organized under two categories. First, the members of some religious traditions
may not be permitted to “sit at the table” and participate in the original
position, and therefore the chosen basic political structure may not accommodate them. I discuss the criteria for drawing the line between participating and excluded religious traditions in Parts III(B) to III(D). Second, even
regarding the participating religious traditions, the original position suggests that people would not conclude that participating religious traditions
would have unlimited autonomy. Rather, the participants in the original
position, not knowing whether they represented (participating) religious
persons or non-religious persons, would opt for what Rawls calls the “first
principle of justice,” which constitutes a generous but non-absolute grant
of liberty to self-actualize in accordance with what a person believes selfactualization requires. I examine these caveats in Parts III(E) –III(F).
B. Participants in the Original Position: Rawls’s “Political Conception
of the Person”
Rawls carefully defines who it is that is imagined to be a participant in the
original position: it is the “the political conception of the person” that is
“drawn on in setting up the original position.”46 That is to say, when “we”
imagine ourselves in the original position, laboring to identify the struc
ture of the just society, the “we”s that we have in mind are those who
conform to the political conception of the person.47 Defining the political
45 Rawls, supra note 43.
46 Ibid., at 29.
47 Ibid.
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conception of the person (PCP) is therefore critical to the Rawlsian enterprise, for it is only people who satisfy the conditions of the PCP whose
interests must be taken into account when setting up the basic structure of
the just state. Persons who fall outside the PCP are not guaranteed that
their interests will be protected; nobody in the original position will necessarily aim to protect their interests because people in the original position
need not consider that they may be representing such persons.48
Rawls’s PCP is importantly different from the understanding of personhood found in Kymlicka’s account, and to the extent that Waldron shares
Kymlicka’s understanding of the importance of culture, from Waldron’s as
well. The PCP “begins from our everyday conception of persons as the basic
units of thought, deliberation, and responsibility.”49 Under it, people are
“seen as capable of revising and changing [their conception of the good] on
reasonable and rational grounds, and they may do this if they so desire.”50
Rawls’s PCP hence does not appear to take account of the role played by
societal culture in shaping people’s perceptions and deliberative processes.
To fully understand the different theories of personhood held by Kymlicka
and Rawls, consider that, in Kymlicka’s account, culture goes so far as to
bound the scope of plausible options among which most individuals make
choices. For Kymlicka,
[t]he freedom which liberals demand for individuals is not primarily the
freedom to go beyond one’s language and history, but rather the freedom to
move around within one’s societal culture, to distance oneself from particular
cultural roles, to choose which features of the culture are most worth
developing, and which are without value.51

The mere fact that Rawls’s PCP incorporates a contested theory of personhood does not disqualify his theory; as Waldron convincingly argues, all
political theories are premised on contestable theories of personhood.52
The important question is whether the particular theory of personhood
that Rawls chooses, and the people with different theories of personhood
whom Rawls thereby excludes from participation in designing the just
state, is wise and justifiable.
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Ibid., at 103.
Ibid., at 18 n.20.
Ibid., at 30; see also Ibid., at 31–32.
Kymlicka, supra note 14, at 90–91.
Waldron, supra note 26, at 759.
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C. Should (Some) Illiberal Religious Groups Participate in the Original
Position?
As discussed above, the PCP “begins from our everyday conception of persons as the basic units of thought, deliberation, and responsibility.”53 Under
it, people are “seen as capable of revising and changing [their conception of
the good] on reasonable and rational grounds, and they may do this if they
so desire.”54 Though it may appear that the PCP makes only minimalist
assumptions, some religious traditions, and maybe many, do not share its
understanding of personhood. Whereas the PCP assumes that individuals
are the “basic units of thought,” some religious traditions take the view that
people’s ideas, values, and very identities are deeply shaped by the polities
in which they live.55 Call this “Government Socialization.” Some religious
traditions also appear to reject Rawls’s assumption that individuals are the
“basic units of . . . responsibility,” and instead adopt what may be called an
understanding of “Interconnected Welfare,” which maintains that an individual’s prospects for self-actualization are inextricably connected to how
other individuals in the community behave and (perhaps even) believe.56
The theory of personhood that gives rise to Government Socialization and
Interconnected Welfare often, but not necessarily, leads to the view that
government must play an extensive role in its citizens’ lives, in other words,
it leads to “Perfectionism.” Perfectionists believe that society, including
government, must actively promote a thick understanding of the “good” if
its citizens are to be in a position to fully self-actualize.
Whether a traditional Rawlsian would exclude members of a particular
religious tradition from participating in the original position ultimately
turns on the definition of “basic units of thought… and responsibility.”
My argument in this paper is that members of many (perhaps most) religious traditions should be included in the original position. It matters not
for present purposes whether this is accomplished by construing “basic
units of thought… and responsibility” sufficiently broadly to include those

53 Rawls, supra note 42, at 20.
54 Ibid., at 30; see also Ibid., at 31–32 and 302.
55 Similar ideas have been put forward by Will Kymlicka, Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer,
and Charles Taylor.
56 This notion is well captured in the Talmudic dictum of “cal yisrael arevim zeh la’zeh.”
Babylonian Talmud Tractate Shavu’oth 39a. This means that all coreligionists “are as sureties
for one another” in spiritual matters. In other words, just as a surety must pay for the insolvency of another, one co-religionist is accountable for the spiritual wrongdoing of another.
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who hold some version of Government Socialization and Interconnected
Welfare, or by broadening the PCP on the ground that Rawls’s definition is
unnecessarily restrictive. But because I believe that Rawls’s definition of
PCP is most readily understood as excluding theories of personhood that
give rise to Government Socialization and Interconnected Welfare, I think
it more accurate to say that Rawls’s definition is unnecessarily restrictive
and ought to be modified to include many perfectionist religious groups.
There are two reasons why perfectionist religious traditions should not
be excluded per se from the original position. First, including them, to the
extent possible, is demanded by foundational liberal commitments.
Consistent with the views of most liberals, Rawls agrees that a liberal polity
should be as neutral as possible, that is to say, as inclusive as possible of
“comprehensive doctrines.”57 The theory of personhood that gives rise to
Government Socialization and Interconnected Welfare grows out of a comprehensive doctrine quite different from that which underwrites the PCP.58
Political liberalism would not be true to its core commitments if its polity
afforded liberty only to “others who think just as we do.” If possible, people
holding both comprehensive doctrines should be included in the original
position.
Second, there are powerful pragmatic reasons59 why people holding
both comprehensive doctrines should be included, if possible. In many

57 Rawls, supra note 42, at 198 (acknowledging that one could justly object if “the wellordered society of political liberalism fails to establish, in ways that circumstances allow . . .
a just basic structure within which permissible forms of life have a fair opportunity to maintain themselves and to gain adherents over generations”).
58 I recognize that Rawls claims that his project is premised on a political doctrine rather
than a comprehensive philosophical or moral doctrine (see, e.g., Rawls, supra note 42, at xv),
but this distinction is difficult to maintain if, as others have recognized (see, e.g., J. Waldron,
supra note 26, at 759), Rawls’s political doctrine proceeds on the basis of a contestable, nonaxiomatic theory of personhood.
59 Do pragmatic reasons “count” from an internal Rawlsian perspective? If not, I am content to throw my lot with Sen and advocate that what we should do is aim for incremental
improvements in justice rather than perfect justice, see A. Sen, supra note 4, at 106, and that
an incremental improvement can be obtained by maximizing the number of participants in
the original position (with the qualifications discussed above in the text). But it seems to me
that such pragmatic considerations are agreeable to a Rawlsian. After all, many aspects of
the Rawlsian framework accept contemporary realities as a given rather than look to a
transcendentally utopian but pragmatically unreachable state of afffairs. A good example
is the assumption that animates Rawls’s entire project, namely, that the existence of a
“diversity of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in democratic
societies is a permanent feature of the public culture and not a mere historical condition
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countries today significant populations of people hold theories of personhood more in line with Government Socialization and/or Interconnected
Welfare. It makes sense, therefore, to design a basic political structure that
accommodates them, which is best done by allowing them to participate in
the original position,60 if it is possible to do so.
But then why should anybody be excluded from participation in the original position? Would it not be better if it were wholly inclusive?
There are two reasons for excluding some people from participation in
the original position: one is legitimate, the other is not. The legitimate reason is that deciding who is included in the original position is another way
of determining who is to be part of a country’s political community.61 It is
not unreasonable to conclude that some people have views and values that
make it impossible to share political community with them. This reason
suggests, however, that exclusions from participation in the original position ought to be made only rarely, and that there should be a strong presumption of inclusion, particularly regarding persons who already dwell in
the midst of a given country.62
Rawls’s political conception of the person excludes a broader range of
people than those with whom it would be impossible to share a political
community. Why does he take such an approach? It seems akin to reverse

soon to pass away.” This takes as a given the borders that define existing states and that join
heterogeneous populations under the banner of a single country, and aims to devise the best
polity under these (not necessarily ideal) circumstances. Indeed, as best as I can tell, Rawls
makes no effort to determine an ideal size of a polity, or to suggest criteria that ideally inform
how membership in a political community should be determined (tasks that did not elude
other political theorists with whom Rawls had intimate familiarity, such as Plato).
Accordingly, Rawls’s project accepts important “facts on the ground” as a given and aims to
create the best possible political structure given these facts, but not necessarily the most
perfect political structure imaginable. There is no reason, therefore, to assume that the pragmatic considerations adduced above fall outside a Rawlsian framework.
60 Although it is theoretically possible for people to be accommodated without participating in the original position (insofar as participants could plausibly conclude to design a
political structure that accommodates non-participants), any such accommodation
notwithstanding-exclusion is a second-best for two reasons. First, participation in the original position is what grounds the legitimacy of governmental authority insofar as the
participants, and only they, can be said to have given their consent. Second, the underlying
logic that motivates the heuristic device of the original position is that the basic political
structure is better chosen by the transformation, under the veil of ignorance, of narrow selfinterest into society-wide interest than by relying on others to look out for one’s interests.
61 See Rawls, supra note 42, at 300-302.
62 Such a presumption of inclusivity is an aspect of Rawlsian political liberalism, but not
necessarily of all liberal polities. I do not here pursue further this important point.
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engineering: Rawls wants to conclude that his two principles of justice
would be unanimously agreed upon by participants in the original position,63 but he can obtain unanimity only by limiting those who can participate in the original position. It seems to me that this is not a legitimate
justification for exclusion, for three reasons.
First, the claim of unanimity is sophistry if unanimity is achievable only
by limiting who participates. Second, exclusion in order to achieve (an illusion of) unanimity masks an important problem: since unanimity is not
actually possible, what should be done with those who never agree to society’s baseline rules? This concern is particularly acute in respect to people
already living within a country, especially if they are citizens.64
Third and most important for present purposes, the PCP excludes more
than is necessary. A stable liberal polity can be achieved without excluding
all persons who fall outside of the PCP. This can best be seen by eschewing
Rawls’s attempt to achieve unanimity through reverse-engineering, and
instead proceeding as follows. Let us assume that the first principle of justice is fair and extraordinarily well thought-out (even if it does not command unanimous assent), and let us consider what groups can be
accommodated consistently with the first principle. In other words, rather
than stacking the deck, by exclusion, to achieve unanimity among participants in the original position, let us be more inclusive about who can
participate in the original position, and let us exclude from accommodation only those who cannot satisfy the requirements of the first principle.
As I show in the next subsection, proceeding this way demonstrates that
some people falling outside the PCP can be, and therefore should be, accommodated in a stable liberal polity.
Two objections to this proposal can be anticipated. First, broadening the
PCP in the manner I suggest would make it impossible to derive the first
principle of justice because one must start with certain assumptions about
people before one can determine what political principles they would
assent to. To answer this objection, I agree that one must start with some
assumptions concerning personhood, but the assumptions held by some
Perfectionists are not necessarily inconsistent with the first principle of justice. That is to say, people in the original position, understanding that they

63 Rawls, supra note 42, at 299. Sen observes this point concerning unanimity as well.
See Sen, supra note 4, at 59.
64 Nevertheless, I do not explore it further here because it extends beyond the limited
subject of this essay.
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may be representing Perfectionists or non-Perfectionists,65 would think it
fair to create a basic political structure consistent with Rawls’s first principle of justice.
Second, an objection may be raised that my proposal undermines the
logic of the original position in particular, and social contrarian approaches
in general, insofar as it posits that participants understand that it would be
impossible to accommodate some of the people they potentially represent
in the resulting liberal state.66 But this objection is tautological; there is no
good reason, apart from sheer definition, why participants in the original
position would not be satisfied to create a maximally accommodating polity. This is particularly true because Rawls’s approach cannot be said to be
wholly inclusive; Rawls also excludes people, albeit at the front-end (by
means of his PCP) rather than the back-end (by virtue of what is agreed
upon in the original position). Finally, this second objection is unavailing
because, as it is made clear in the next section, my proposal excludes fewer
people than does Rawls’s. Accordingly, the logic behind the second objection actually supports my proposal, and serves as an objection to Rawls’s.
D. Can Any Perfectionists Be Accommodated in the Liberal State?
Limiting participation to a narrowly construed “political conception of the
person,” and excluding from the original position those religious groups
that are committed to either Government Socialization or Interconnected
Welfare, would be most readily justifiable (although still not necessarily
justified67) if such exclusion were necessary to secure a stable liberal polity.
65 In the next section of this essay I distinguish two types of Perfectionists: Localist and
Universalist. The first principle of justice would be chosen only by Localist Perfectionists.
Therefore, the more precise way of phrasing the point above in text is that people in the
original position, not knowing whether they were non-Perfectionists or Local Perfectionists,
would agree upon the first principle of justice.
66 For an illuminating discussion that explains why contrarianism is generally understood to demand that a veto power be granted to all participants, see D.M. Estlund,
Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework, 57–237 (2008). Estlund rejects contrarianism on the ground that a veto is unworkable, whereas I maintain a contractarian
model while jettisoning the veto (at least insofar as veto power is understood to mean that
all participants must be accommodated in the just polity), for reasons provided above in
the text.
67 A full account of what justice demands would require a consideration of whether
such groups ought to have a right to secede and to accordingly govern themselves independently. This observation highlights a possible real-world cost of Rawls’s uncritical acceptance of the contemporary borders that define countries. See supra note 60.
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The claim that people who believed in Government Socialization or
Interconnected Welfare necessarily had to be excluded, which I aim to
refute below, presumably runs as follows. The theory of personhood that
gives rise to Government Socialization and Interconnected Welfare naturally leads to Perfectionism insofar as Perfectionists believe that government must actively promote a thick understanding of the “good” if its
citizens are to be in a position to fully self-actualize. On the assumption
that citizens in a country frequently have divergent and at the same time
reasonable comprehensive views, a government that pursued perfectionist
ends not shared by all citizens would seem to invite sectarianism and sharp
fissures. Moreover, forcing some citizens to adopt comprehensive views
they do not share would be the antithesis of liberalism.
It is on the basis of these very reasons that Rawls explicitly concludes that
liberal polities cannot tolerate Perfectionism.68 Rawls is mistaken, however, because political liberalism can and therefore should tolerate some
Perfectionists, though not all. I explain why in two steps. Subsection 1
explains why, under Rawls’s first principle of justice, Religious Perfection
ists should be accommodated if possible. Subsection 2 explains why some
Religious Perfectionists can be accommodated. This analysis is relevant
to the question at hand because the most difficult questions concerning
the educational autonomy of religious groups arise in respect to perfec
tionist religious groups.
1. The Affirmative Case for Accommodating Perfectionists to the
Extent Possible
The first principle of justice encompasses the liberty of citizens to selfactualize in accordance with their views of what self-actualization requires,
to the extent that doing so is consistent with other citizens’ similar right
to self-actualization – what may be called a reciprocal liberty to selfactualize. Creating a basic political structure that allows non-Perfectionists
the opportunity to self-actualize in accordance with their views, but that
does not afford the same opportunity to Perfectionists to the extent that
this is possible, would violate the first principle of justice.
The first principle of justice is that “[e]ach person has an equal right to a
[1] fully adequate scheme of [2] equal basic liberties which is [3] compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.”69 The first principle of justice

68 See Rawls, supra note 42, at 62; 196–197.
69 Ibid., at 291.
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encompasses a presumptive need to accommodate Perfectionists for two
reasons. First, as to subcomponent [3], Rawls states that “[t]he basic liberties (freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, and so on)… are the
background institutional conditions necessary for the development and
the full informed exercise of the two moral powers,”70 one of which is the
capacity to formulate a conception of the good.71 The first principle of justice thus presumptively requires that Perfectionists have access to what
they require to develop their conception of the good.
There is a second reason why Perfectionists should be presumptively
accommodated under the first principle of justice. Rawls states that a “fully
adequate scheme” refers to the “criterion… to specify and adjust the basic
liberties so as to allow the adequate development and the full and informed
exercise of… [the] capacity for a sense of justice.”72 A sense of justice
“expresses a willingness, if not the desire, to act in relation to others on
terms that they also can publicly endorse.”73 As such, a “sense of justice” is
connected to willing “compl[iance] with society’s basic institutions . . .”74
Accommodating Perfectionists is consistent with the development of a
sense of justice in Perfectionists because citizens are apt to willingly act in
accordance with the basic structure of society if that structure allows them
to live in accordance with their views of what self-actualization requires.
2. Which Perfectionists Can Be Accommodated?
Rawls mistakenly concludes that liberal polities cannot accommodate any
Perfectionists because he overlooks the possibility of a federalist “basic
structure” that would permit Perfectionists to dwell and maintain themselves in sub-federal polities. Rawls's arguments against the possibility of
accommodating Perfectionist communities make sense only on the
assumption that there exists only a single centralized government. For
example, Rawls argues that a well-ordered democratic society cannot be a
community, by which he means a
society governed by a shared comprehensive religious, philosophical, or
moral doctrine. To think of a democracy as a community (so defined) overlooks
the limited scope of its public reason founded on a political conception of
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Ibid., at 308.
Ibid., at 19.
Ibid., at 19, 333.
Ibid., at 19.
Ibid., at 35.
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justice. It mistakes the kind of unity a constitutional regime is capable of
without violating the most basic democratic principles.75

One may ask: Does the existence of so-called “Indian country” within the
United States – where religious tribal governments are not subject to disestablishment requirements with the result that religious institutions can
exercise political power over a community united by shared religious
beliefs76 – mean that the political structure of the United States violates
“the most basic democratic principles?” The opposite is true: granting
Native Americans political space within which they can largely self-govern
to perpetuate their distinctive culture notwithstanding the country’s alien
majority culture enhances liberal values by expanding the set of reasonable
comprehensive views that can flourish. This logic can be generalized
beyond the case of Native Americans: allowing islands of perfectionist
communities within an ocean of liberal institutional and legal structures
deepens the liberal character of society by increasing the chances that
adherents of reasonable comprehensive doctrines can self-develop in
accordance with their views of what self-actualization requires.
The possibility of perfectionist carve-outs means that it is possible to
accommodate some, though not all forms of Perfectionism within political
liberalism. In particular, political liberalism can and therefore should
accommodate “Localist” Perfectionists. The only Perfectionists for whom it
cannot make room are “Universalist” Perfectionists. Localist Perfectionists
desire only that their local governments be empowered to pursue perfectionist agendas, and are willing to allow other parts of society to be governed differently. There are two types of Localist Perfectionists. “Insular
Perfectionists” do not think that the ideals and practices of their communities should be binding on those outside their community, but seek only to
preserve themselves. This is true of many aboriginal communities.
“Exemplary Perfectionists,” by contrast, hope to spur larger societal changes
and alter the behavior of others outside their communities, but only by
example, not by physical or political coercion. In sharp contrast to Localist
Perfectionists, Universalist Perfectionists aim to achieve control of the
machinery of the general (federal) government to compel others to live in
75 Ibid., at 42 (emphasis supplied).
76 W.C. Banby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell, 246 (2d ed., 1989) (noting that
Pueblo tribal government and religious authorities are wholly intertwined); Kavena v.
Hamilton, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6061, 6061 (Hopi Tr. Ct. 1988), aff’d, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6063 (Hopi
Tr. App. Ct. 1989) (“Hopi religion and village organization in the traditional village organizations is virtually inseparable. Membership in a village is in part religious as well as civil.”)
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accordance with their views of the good. (The next section explains in
greater detail why Universalist Perfectionists cannot be accommodated as
a matter of liberal political theory.)77
Two other points deserve mentioning. First, the “federalist” structure
that makes accommodating Localist Perfectionists possible does not necessarily require physically separate spaces within which Local Perfection
ists can live and isolate themselves. Rather, a sufficient federalist structure
would be a government willing to shift some regulatory authority to the
Perfectionist community. Such regulatory authority need not be exercisable in a discrete physical space in which no other (non-Perfectionist) governmental entity had jurisdiction. To follow with the example of Indian
country mentioned above, the state and federal governments exercise governmental power in Indian country. Furthermore, many non-Indians live
in Indian country. This paper is not the place to elaborate the particulars of
what a federalist structure may look like, but it is important to note that it
does not necessarily entail geographical isolation from general society.
Second, the foregoing analysis has important implications for the stance
of political liberalism towards religious communities that require less
accommodation than perfectionists do. If the outer marker of what political liberalism can accommodate can extend to perfectionist religious communities, then political liberalism can accommodate religious groups that
require less.78
E. Limitation I: The Requirement of “Well-Orderedness”
In addition to requiring that Perfectionists be accommodated to the
extent possible, the first principle of justice also contains constraints that
(1) determine which Perfectionists cannot be accommodated and that
(2) impose discrete but important limitations and obligations upon those
Perfectionists that can be accommodated.
The first principle of justice is that “[e]ach person has an equal right to a
fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a
77 Considerations aside from principle may well lead people in a particular polity to conclude that even Universalist Perfectionists in their midst should be accommodated. Such
accommodations, however, are properly understood to be violations, rather than vindications, of liberal commitments.
78 The normative argument why non-perfectionist religious groups should be accommodated is different, however, than the argument regarding perfectionists, primarily because
the needs for accommodations of non-perfectionists may be less pressing from their own
perspectives than are the needs of perfectionists.
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similar scheme of liberties for all.”79 “Fully adequate scheme” refers to the
“criterion… to specify and adjust the basic liberties so as to allow the adequate development and the full and informed exercise of both moral powers in the social circumstances under which the two fundamental cases
arise in the well-ordered society in question.”80
The requirement of a “fully adequate scheme” imposes an important
limitation on which Perfectionists can be accommodated and places constraints on those Perfectionists that can be accommodated. Rawls plausibly
defines a “well-ordered society” to mean a polity in which “citizens have a
normally effective sense of justice and so they generally comply with society’s basic institutions, which they regard as just.”81 Well-orderedness thus
is synonymous with conditions that permit and promote an “enduring and
secure” political regime,82 thereby preserving one of liberalism’s foremost
accomplishments of bringing about peace and avoiding sectarian conflicts
of the sort found in the centuries-long European wars of religion.83 Wellorderedness means that Perfectionists can be accommodated only if they
have a peaceful disposition toward their non-Perfectionist neighbors. This
is why Universalist Perfectionists cannot be accommodated. There is no
reason, however, to think that Localist Perfectionists are inconsistent with
a well-ordered society. On the contrary, their “localist” ideologies are fully
consistent with well-orderedness.
Well-orderedness also entails substantive limitations on the activ
ities that qualifying Perfectionists can undertake. Among others, wellorderedness imposes important educational obligations. Those raised in
religious perfectionist communities must be educated in a manner that
encourages them to understand the justice of the polity in which they live,
so that they willingly comply with the basic institutions of society.84 It may
be necessary to teach citizens about the political theory that justifies the
basic structure of society (helping them to understand the essentials of
the argument developed here).85 It is also essential to equip them with the
79 Banby, supra note 76, at 291 (emphasis added).
80 Rawls, supra note 42, at 333.
81 Ibid., at 35.
82 Ibid., at 38.
83 Ibid., at xxviii.
84 Rawls’ theory imposes significant educational requirements on secular communities
as well. For an illuminating discussion, see E. Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education
and Liberal Democracy (1997).
85 Moreover, there is no reason to think that this type of education would undermine the
ability of minority societal cultures to survive. Such an education is not inconsistent with
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attitudes and habits required to achieve and secure a stable democratic
polity. Such educational requirements do not seem to be inconsistent with
the comprehensive doctrines that give rise to Localist Perfectionism.
Determining the precise contents of the “attitudes and habits” requisite
for a stable democracy is a crucial task the details of which I cannot hope to
flesh out here. But there is one important observation that can be made:
the original position provides the appropriate framework for determining
these details, suggesting that these requirements should be understood
modestly rather than expansively because expansive “attitudes and habits”
could lead to the unnecessary exclusion of some Perfectionists, which people in the original position would not want to do.86
In the end, the education required by well-orderedness must be settled
empirically, and likely will be a function of such context-specific factors as
the background attitudes of a particular illiberal religious group, the number of illiberal groups in a given state, the proportion of the state population that the illiberal group constitutes, and so forth. Sen’s argument that
what matters is “actual social realizations”87 has particular bite here.
F. Limitation II: The Requirement of Opt-Out
The third component of the first principle of justice is that the basic structure be “compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.” This “compatibility” requirement confirms the need to accommodate Perfectionists to

the position advocated in this paper concerning the need to accommodate select minority
societal cultures.
86 Professor Walzer’s contribution to this conference makes much headway on the crucial issue of those attitudes and habits necessary for a stable liberal polity. Some of the specifics Professor Walzer identified in his public lecture, however, struck me as unnecessarily
expansive. For example, Professor Walzer argued that democratic regimes require that their
citizens reject “hierarchical arrangements” and freely decide political questions on their
own. This appears to be an overly strict requirement insofar as many well-functioning
democracies, including the United States, have had “voting blocs” in which citizens have
taken their cues from religious or political leaders about whom they should support. This
has been true, for instance, of the African-American community, the “Moral Majority,” and
likely remains true for many mainstream Democrat and Republican voters in the United
States. Although it is possible that a rejection of hierarchical arrangements may be necessary in some countries because of the number of illiberal groups present and because of
other context-specific considerations, it seems difficult to maintain that it is universally
necessary.
87 See Sen, supra note 4, at 68, 84–85.
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the extent possible,88 but it also imposes some constraints on Localist
Perfectionists. To satisfy the compatibility requirement, persons must have
the right to choose in which community they can live. This entails both the
option to “opt-out” of the environment in which they find themselves, and
to “opt-in” to another.
To understand why, imagine a perfectionist community that sought to
flatly prohibit its members from exiting. Persons living in a perfectionist
community without sharing its commitments and who felt that remain
ing in the community impeded their ability to self-actualize would not
enjoy the same liberty of exercising meaningful choice that is enjoyed by a
person who lived in the majority societal culture and was satisfied by it.
To make the liberty of members of perfectionist communities “compatible
with a similar scheme of liberties” for those who do not identify with the
perfectionist culture, people in perfectionist communities must have the
ability to opt-out and leave the community into which they happened to be
born and opt-in to a new culture.
Ensuring that members of a religious group have a meaningful right to
opt-out has difficult educational implications and raises a host of other
issues that are beyond the question at hand of educational autonomy.89
The question is typically framed as follows: How much knowledge about
life outside the minority culture, and how much training to support oneself
and otherwise survive in the outside world, is necessary for the opt-out
right to be real?90 The problem for opt-out is that the education provided
by the perfectionist community typically valorizes its own culture and
ignores or degrades others, thereby undermining the likelihood that its
members will opt for the other. The question then becomes what are the
prerequisites for the decision to remain in the minority societal culture to
88 The compatibility requirement can be met only by allowing space for Perfectionists to
self-actualize in accordance with their views of what self-actualization requires (to the
extent possible). Not accommodating Perfectionists violates the compatibility requirement
because such a non-accommodating polity would only allow non-Perfectionists the liberty
of self-actualizing in accordance with their views of what self-actualization requires.
89 I pay no further attention here to the scope of opt-in rights because it is not directly
relevant to the question at hand concerning the educational autonomy of religious groups.
I have explored this issue in some detail elsewhere. See Rosen, supra note 27, at 824–826.
90 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241, 245–246 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be
forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today …
If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him and if his education
is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed”).
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be meaningful, so that the right to opt-out is meaningful and real, and not
merely theoretical.
A useful way to begin to answer these questions is to refer back to the
original position and ask what type of education is necessary for people to
have meaningful opt-out rights. But first, we must acknowledge that such
an approach cannot come close to fully answering these questions for several reasons. On one hand, the heuristic of the original position does not
provide the means for determining how risk-averse its participants are. For
example, there have always been innovators who have been able to opt-out
of the societies into which they were born simply by virtue of their intellects, and many others for whom a sense of adventure and some degree of
dissatisfaction with the status quo have sufficed to prompt them to leave
their homes, as attested to by the vast history of immigration. For these
people, the knowledge that there is an outside world, coupled with the
absence of physical restraint, is sufficient to provide a meaningful opt-out
right.
On the other hand, innovators and immigrants are the exception, not the
norm. It might be suggested that persons in the original position should
calibrate opt-out to more of a “median” risk-taking personality. This, however, invariably involves making contested psychological and sociological
assumptions about the contents of such a median proclivity. Moreover,
even assuming a consensus concerning the median personality, pegging
opt-out to the median would be controversial because it would not provide
adequate resources for persons below the median of risk-taking, who would
be reluctant to leave the culture into which they have been born unless
they were very well acquainted with the alternative culture and able to
make a good living there.
This might lead one to suggest that opt-out should be calibrated to the
most risk-averse, but this solution also comes at a cost. Educating children
so that they can readily opt-out of the culture into which they were born
would likely risk undermining the ability of that culture to perpetuate
itself. This is particularly true for perfectionist cultures that believe that the
proper road to self-actualization requires a long-term dedication to behaviors and practices that are difficult for most people at first. Such perfectionists might fear that too easy an opt-out option would entice community
members away from the difficult but ultimately rewarding and correct path
that community culture prescribes. For these reasons, educating children
in a way that brings opt-out costs to zero would likely be rejected by people
in the original position.
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Although it is difficult to concretely identify the educational prerequisites of the opt-out requirement, it is possible to make some solid, useful
observations. To begin, almost invariably there will be tension between the
requirement of opt-out and the first-order educational preferences of a perfectionist community. The operative principle is that perfectionists can
educate their children as they wish, subject to the caveat that people in the
perfectionist communities be able to make informed life-style choices pursuant to non-perfectionists’ understanding of what informed decisionmaking requires.
But what precisely does informed decision making require? Several
things can be said. For one, meaningful opt-out does not mean that children raised in perfectionist communities must be educated so that they
can earn what they would have earned had they been raised outside the
perfectionist community. Such a concern for diminished earning potential
animated Justice Douglas’s partial dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the wellknown American case that exempted an Old Order Amish community
from the state compulsory education law and permitted Amish children to
be removed from school after the eighth grade.91 But Justice Douglas’s concern is misplaced, and it is the eight other Justices’ understanding that is
justifiable, because diminished earning power does not make opt-out a
mere formality. Consider, for example, an Amish boy with native intelligence that could have earned him admission to Harvard College had he
been given a public high school education, but who received only an eighth
grade Amish education and consequently could only obtain a job as a carpenter if he elected to exit from the Old Amish order. The fact that the boy’s
Amish education precluded him from obtaining a job as an investment
banker upon graduation from Harvard is not relevant to ascertaining
whether he has real or merely formal opt-out rights. What is relevant is his
earning capacity as a carpenter outside his community, compared with
what his standard of living would be were he to remain within the Amish
community. The modest lifestyle of the Amish means that even an eighthgrade education would make the opt-out rights real. More generally, the
amount of education necessary to enable a community member to earn a

91 Ibid., at 205, 245–46 (“It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that
is imperiled by today’s decision. If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade
school, then the child will be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of
diversity that we have today … If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed.”)
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living outside the community for purposes of opt-out varies from community to community, and it depends on the community’s standard of living.
It might be thought that subjecting children to a perfectionist environment in which they are deprived of access to certain books and perspectives, and thereby socialized in a certain way, necessarily deprives them of
the ability to make a fully objective choice as to whether they should
remain or exit the community. But this view of opt-out is unsatisfactory
because all environments, including non-perfectionist society, socialize
children.92 Rawls himself reluctantly acknowledges this fact,93 and this
insight lies at the heart of Kymlicka’s understanding of societal culture and
of his assumption that people generally move around within their societal
culture, not between or among cultures.94
Indeed, the view that cultures possess non-trivial socializing power that
inclines their members to remain within them is not a deeply controversial
proposition, and it has important implications for the requirements of optout. If the typical effect of (even liberal) culture and education is to largely
ensure that members remain within their societal cultures for their lifetimes, and if people in the original position understand this to be the case,
they would not think that opt-out is satisfied only when people can make
fully autonomous choices to remain in their culture.95 People in the original position may be satisfied with softer opt-out conditions, such as the
absence of physical restraints and perhaps merely the knowledge that there
exists a different world out there. Undoubtedly, more thought must be
given to this important issue.
Proceeding to more controversial assumptions concerning personhood,
if something like Kymlicka’s understanding of culture is correct, then the
heart of opt-out is not a person’s ability to move from a perfectionist community to a non-perfectionist community or vice versa, but something else
that is frequently overlooked. As noted above, Kymlicka argues that the
92 See, e.g., N.M. Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out: Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education”, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 581 (1993);
M. Halbertal, “Autonomy, Toleration, and Group Rights”, in D. Heyd (ed.), Toleration, 111–112
(1996).
93 Rawls, supra note 42, at 200 (acknowledging that the type of education necessary to
sustain the polity he envisions “is in effect, though not in intention, to educate [children] to
a comprehensive liberal conception”).
94 Kymlicka, supra note 14, at 90.
95 The requirement of well-orderedness, however, may well place limits on the extent to
which minority societal cultures can demonize other cultures in the process of educating
their youth.
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autonomy that liberalism presumes is the “freedom to move around within
one’s societal culture, to distance oneself from particular cultural roles, to
choose which features of the culture are most worth developing, and which
are without value.”96 If this is so, people in the original position would be
deeply concerned about having the right to move from one point to another
within their particular societal culture — what we might call an “intracultural opt-out right.” This would have important educational implications
for religious groups, for it suggests that they cannot enforce orthodoxies in
order to preclude internal criticisms and reforms of their cultures. To be
sure, state enforcement of intra-cultural opt-out rights itself would risk
entangling the state in supervision of the religious group and may even trigger concerns that the state was establishing religion in polities committed
to non-establishment. I do not purport to definitively settle here the appropriate bounds of such an opt-out right, but only to flag the right and some
issues it might implicate.
IV. Conclusion
The analysis in this essay suggests that people in the original position
would think it fair to establish a basic political structure that allows many
perfectionist groups, including many religious groups, to flourish, subject
to the important but discrete limitations imposed by the requirements of
well-orderedness and opt-out. A crucial implication of this analysis is that
accommodating minority societal cultures is not simply something that is
in the best interests of the perfectionist groups, but is in the best interest of
general society. This is true because general society best lives up to its foundational liberal commitments when it allows such groups space to largely
rule their lives, subject to the limitations discussed above.

96 Ibid.

